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I. INTRODUCTION
Technology,1 like land, labor and capital, is an important determi-
nant of economic growth.2 This is clearly evidenced by the developed
countries' use of their technological superiority in achieving rapid in-
dustrialization, while fostering the dramatic growth in their economies.
Consequently, developing countries view the transfer of technology
from developed countries as an important means of bridging the ever
widening gap3 between the economic growth rates of developed and de-
* J.S.D., Candidate, Standford Law School; M.A., Temple University; L.L.M.,
Temple University School of Law; L.L.B., University of Ghana.
1. Technology is broadly defined here to include industrial processes, engineering
design, plant construction and installation, training of technical and managerial person-
nel, management and operation of production facilities, marketing information and im-
provements to processes and product designs. See Guidelines for the Study of the
Transfer of Technology, 5 UNCTAD TD/B/AC.I 1/9 (1972).
2. P.B. HELLER, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND HUMAN VALUES 14 (1985). The
significance of technology to economic growth has thus been expressed by Simon
Kuznets, a Nobel prize winning economist:
The major capital stock of an industrially advanced nation is not its physical
equipment: it is the body of knowledge amassed from tested findings of empirical
science and the capacity and training of its population to use this knowledge effec-
tively. One can easily envisage a situation in which technological progress permits
output at a high rate without any additions to the stock of capital goods.
S. KUZNETS, TOWARD A THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 34-35 (1968).
3. In 1970, the five richest countries; Switzerland, Luxembourg, West Germany,
(301)
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veloping countries."
Characteristically, developing countries are overpopulated, lack re-
sources, and suffer from a lack of motivation influenced largely by the
absence of know-how, high illiteracy rate, unemployment and ineffec-
tive utilization of existing resources.' All these factors combine to bring
about a lack of productivity, and hence a low level of output in the
economy. This bleak scenario places these countries in a vicious cycle
of underdevelopment. 6 Technology transfer compares favorably with in-
creased savings, international trade, and foreign aid7 as a measure for
breaking this vicious cycle.8 Transferred technology can lead to devel-
opment by expanded export capability and/or import substitution. The
infusion of export trade-oriented technologies experienced by Korea,
Singapore and Taiwan in the late 1970s and the resulting increases in
their exports, enhanced the competitiveness of those countries in the
world market. 9 The transfer of suitable technology for production of
goods and services to replace the imports would also lead to an im-
Denmark, and Sweden, with 6.179% of the world population accounted for 9.741% of
total income, while the poorest countries; Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Chad and Ethio-
pia, with a population of 1.585% had .048% of the world's total income. By 1981, the
rich nations had increased their total income to 26.248% and reduced their population
to 5.644%. The poor countries, on the other hand, had increased their incomes to a
mere .167% and witnessed an increase of their population to 1.692% of the world's
population. See A.C. Samli, Technology Transfer to the Third World Countries and
Economic Development, in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 17-18 (1985).
4. M. CORTES & P. BOCOCK, NORTH-SOUTH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: A CASE-
STUDY OF PETRO-CHEMICALS IN LATIN AMERICA 3 (1984).
5. Wasted resources are seen not only in the prevailing unemployment and under-
employment but also in the treatment of women. Their exclusion from some of the
social, political and business institutions makes it impossible for them to contribute to
economic growth and development. Id. at 20.
6. As underdeveloped economies, these developing countries typically have low in-
comes and a concomitant tendency towards consumption, with little savings. Low sav-
ings translate into low investments and result in a scarcity of capital, which leads again
to a low level of productivity.
7. R.H. CASSEN, RICH COUNTRY INTERESTS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT
(1982).
8. Savings patterns have not caught on in developing countries as there is a natu-
ral tendency to prefer consumption to saving. Additionally, international trade tends to
encourage production for world markets at the expense of local consumption, and has
been characterized by a precarious dependence on commodities which have fared
rather badly in the world markets. Finally, military aid and emergency relief, the main
forms of foreign aid, have had little impact on economic development, given the nar-
rowness of their objectives.
9. Samli, supra note 3, at 24.
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provement in the economy.'
Typically, developing countries seek technology by sending their
nationals to acquire the necessary skills in institutions abroad or by
studying technical literature that has been published in developed na-
tions. 1 However, the most important channels of transfer have been
the activities of transnational corporations ("TNCs") when they en-
gage in direct foreign investments, 2 establish joint ventures,"3 or con-
clude various management and licensing agreements." Turnkey con-
tracts 5 and international subcontracting also serve as forms of
technology transfer.1
10. W.A.P. MANSER & S. WEBLEY, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 32 (1979).
11. C.H.G. Oldham, C. Freeman & F. Sercovitch, The Channels and Mecha-
nisms for the Transfer of Technology From Developed to Developing Countries, 8
U.N. Doc. TD/28/Supp.1 (1967).
12. Direct foreign investment is characterized by the establishment of an affiliate
by the TNC in the host country and the provision of technology, often as a complete
package, comprising capital goods; industrial property rights; secret, unpatented pro-
cess knowledge specific to the investing firms and the TNC's accumulated experience
and skills in organization, management and marketing. Transnational Corporations
and Technology Transfer: Effects and Policy Issues, 3 UNCTC St/CTC/86 (1986)
(hereinafter Transnational Corporations and Technology Transfer).
13. Nearly the same elements of technology are transferred in joint ventures as
are transferred in direct foreign investment, except that in joint ventures the contrac-
tual arrangements are often more specific and entail a joint ownership of business and
a sharing of the investment risk.
14. Licensing as a form of transfer involves the conferral of rights pertaining to
industrial property rights, methods of production and technical services to an agency in
the host country for a specific period of time, in return for certain payments. It is not
uncommon for the TNC's to provide managerial control over an enterprise in a devel-
oping country, covering such matters as production management, purchase and pro-
curement of capital goods and raw materials, marketing and financial management.
Transnational Corporation and Technology Transfer, supra note 12, at 4. See also
V.N. BALASUBRAMANYAN, INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO INDIA 9
(1973).
15. Under them, the TNCs typically assume responsibility for all the activities
involved in the planning, construction and commissioning of a discrete project. This
might entail the supply of know how, basic design and engineering, supply of complete
plant and equipment, design and construction of civil works, initial training of process
operators and even post start-up troubleshooting. Transnational Corporations in World
Development, UNCTC ST/CTC/46 172-74 (1983). As they generally provide for the
complete physical transfer of technology, turnkey contracts tend to be common in situ-
ations where the TNC will not have an on-going interest in the operation or manage-
ment of the operations of the customer firm, as compared to the relationship between
an international engineering firm and a state-owned enterprise. HELLER, supra note 2,
at 6.
16. This form of transfer is especially common in clothing, electronic equipment
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The protectionist policies of industrialized countries have, however,
reduced the availability of technology expected by developing countries
under the various channels of transfer. Such protectionism 17 is usually
seen in the form of export control laws of developed countries and in
the restrictive trade practices engaged in by TNCs, who are the princi-
pal agents in the technology transfer process. This article's objective is
to describe the nature of technological protectionism and to evaluate
the policy response of developing countries. The first section examines
export controls imposed by industrialized countries by focusing exclu-
sively on United States laws which are the most comprehensive in the
area. Section Two analyzes technology controls and the restrictive busi-
ness practices typically adopted by TNCs in technology transfer con-
tracts. The policy response of developing countries under national and
international schemes is discussed in the final portion of the article.
II. EXPORT CONTROLS ON TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES
The most important statute for controlling technology exports in
peacetime in the U.S. is the Export Administration Act of 1979
(EAA)."8 The EAA provides a detailed system of controls in further-
ance of stated national security,19 foreign policy20 and short supply21
and semi-conductor assembly industries. Under this type of contract, the TNC would
typically place an order with a foreign enterprise in a developing country to produce
goods or assemble finished products using inputs and technology supplied by the TNC.
Subcontracting does not involve explicit payments for technology and is valuable as a
form of technology transfer as technological spin-offs often accrue to the local enter-
prise participating. Transnational Corporations and Technology Transfer, supra note
12, at 5-6.
17. The term "protectionism" as used in the literature, refers generally to central
government intervention in the market for traded goods through the imposition of tar-
iffs, export subsidies or quantitative restrictions. D. GREENAWAY & C. MILNER, PRO-
TECTIONIsM AGAIN 16 (1979). The intervention, which is normally directed against
foreign imports in favor of home products, is aimed at providing relief against cheap
foreign labor, assuring employment protection and raising revenue tariffs. The term
will be used in this paper in a much different sense. Here it will refer to measures that
inhibit the flow of technology exports. See G.P. VERBIT, TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES 56-82 (1969); B. HINDLEY & E. NICOLAIDES, TAKING THE
NEW PROTECTIONISM SERIOUSLY (1983); J.T. Cuddington & R.I. McKinnon, Free
Trade Versus Protectionism, in TARIFFS, QUOTAS AND TRADE: THE POLITICS OF PRO-
TECTIONISM 3 (1979) for differing views on this topic.
18. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986).
19. With respect to national security, the EAA permits controls on technology
exports that "would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any
other country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental to the na-
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concerns. Export licensing serves as the vehicle for regulating technol-
ogy exports, and is a power belonging to the President. As permitted by
statute, however, the President has delegated his regulatory powers to
the Secretary of Commerce who is required to consult with the Secre-
taries of Defense and State when controls are necessary for the foreign
policy and national security of the U.S. 2 Various licenses that the Sec-
retary of Commerce could require of exporters include a "valid license"
which allows the export of a specified item following approval of the
exporter's application, a "qualified general license" which permits mul-
tiple exports following application approval, and a "general license"
which permits exports absent an application. 3
Pursuant to statutory provisions the Secretary of Commerce main-
tains a commodity control list (CCL), detailing all goods and technolo-
gies controlled under the EAA and therefore subject to licensing.24
Categories of goods in the CCL include commercial goods with poten-
tial military application, nuclear weapons and crime control equipment
restricted for foreign policy reasons, petroleum products under short
supply controls, and technical data relating to design and manufactur-
ing knowledge.25 Apart from national security, foreign policy and short
supply considerations, a key factor in the decision to place an item in
the CCL is the foreign availability2 of the item to controlled coun-
tries27 from sources outside the U.S.
tional security of the United States." Id. at § 2402(2)(a).
20. The Act may also come into play where it is necessary to restrict imports in
order "to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States, or to fulfill its
international obligation." Id. at § 2402(2)(b). Given the broad nature and vagueness of
political considerations, the types of goods subject to regulation under these provisions
are potentially larger than the national security concerns.
21. The third reason for restricting exports under the Act is "to protect the do-
mestic economy from excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the serious in-
flationary impact on foreign demand." Id. at § 2402(2)(c).
22. Id. at § 2403(e).
23. Additionally, the Secretary could issue any other types of licenses he deems
necessary to enforce the Act. Id. at 2403(a).
24. Id. at § 2403(b).
25. Id. at § 2404(c)(2).
26. Id. at § 2403(c).
27. Under the Act, controlled countries fall into two broad categories; communist
nations and specific nations to which exports are restricted due to foreign policy consid-
erations. Id. at § 2403(b). An interesting mix of considerations determine United
States export policy to controlled countries. They include: a) the country's present and
potential relationships with the United States; b) its present and potential relationships
with countries friendly or hostile to the United States; and c) its ability to control re-
export of U.S. goods and technology in accordance with United States foreign policy.
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Under a blanket provision of the Trading With the Enemy Act of
1917 (TWEA), 8 the U.S. Treasury Department has been able to mon-
itor a wide variety of transactions including technology exports. 9 Its
Foreign Asset Control Regulations, for example, place a nearly total
ban on the exports of technology involving strategic and non-strategic
goods to North Korea, Vietnam, and Kampuchea.3 0 Further, the
Transaction Control Regulation controls technology exports to all com-
munist countries except Cuba, Yugoslavia and Laos,31 while the Cuban
Asset Control Regulations monitors non-strategic exports to Cuba by
U.S. funded foreign firms.32
Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
of 1977 (IEEPA)33 which roughly parallels the broad grant of power
given by TWEA, authorizes national emergency controls on various
transactions. Included are exports to countries while a national emer-
gency exists which is defined as "any unusual and extraordinary threat,
which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United
Before imposing export controls on grounds of foreign policy, however, the President
must consider among other factors 1) the probability that the controls will be effective;
2) the implementation of foreign policy objectives, such as the control of terrorism; 3)
the reaction of other countries to the imposition/expansion of such controls; and 4) the
ability of the U.S. to enforce such controls. Id. at § 2403(b). Where short supply con-
trols are applied, the President would usually allocate a percentage of export licenses
based on a determination of the equitable trade treatment given the U.S. by other
countries during periods of short supply. The criminal penalties for willful violations of
the Act are fines of not more than $100,000.00 or five times the value of the export,
whichever is greater, or a maximum of ten years imprisonment, or both. Civil penalties
include a fine of up to $5,000.00 for each violation and/or a suspension of the right to
export. Id. at § 2410.
28. 50 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). It provides that:
1) During the time of war [or during any other period of national emergency,
declared by the President] the President may, through any agency that he may
designate, or otherwise, and under such rules or regulations as he may prescribe,
by means of instructions, licenses or otherwise, . . . B) investigate, regulate, direct
and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit any ...exportation or ... any
right involving any property in which any country or a national thereof has any
interest, by any person, or with respect to any property subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States.
29. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.311, 515.311 (1987). See also M.P. Malloy, Embargo Pro-
grams of the United States Treasury Depart., 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485
(1981).
30. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201, 500.533 (1987).
31. Id. at § 505.10(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
32. Id. at § 515.559 (1987).
33. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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States, to the national security, foreign policy of the United States." 4
The most notable use of the IEEPA has been in the promulgation of
the Iranian Asset Control Regulations which instituted a licensing
scheme for technology exports to Iran after the hostage seizure.35
The Arms Export Control Act of 1968 (AECA) 8 regulates ex-
ports of technology that are considered to have primarily military use
and are provided for in a special listing of goods and related technology
known as the munitions list.37 Controlling the export of such "defense
articles and defense services" is motivated by the desire to further
"world peace and the security and foreign policy of the U.S."38 For the
export of technology subject to the broad control of the AECA39 an
exporter must obtain a license from the State Department. 0
In addition to its national efforts to control the export of technol-
ogy, the U.S. has been involved with nearly all its NATO allies41 and
Japan, in promulgating significant technology transfer control mea-
sures. These countries belong to the Consultative Group Coordinating
Committee (COCOM), an informal cooperative group that was formed
soon after the Second World War to implement U.S. strategic controls
imposed on the Soviet Union and its satellites. Today, it remains the
function of COCOM to coordinate a multinational strategic embargo,
and in particular restrict export of goods and technologies to the Soviet
Bloc. 2 COCOM regularly updates a detailed list of militarily signifi-
cant productive services agreed by all participants to be subject to con-
trol, and coordinates administration and enforcement activities of the
participant countries.
To govern the unauthorized transfer of technologies, developed
countries have instituted elaborate travel restrictions on nationals of
34. Id. at § 1701(a).
35. 31 C.F.R. § 535.207(b) (1980).
36. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982).
37. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1987).
38. Id. at § 2778(a)(i).
39. Types of technology that would come under the AECA include 1) proposals to
any foreign government or foreign national that would enable such person to decide to
acquire significant combat equipment; 2) proposed agreements and amendments to ex-
isting agreements for the manufacture abroad of or for furnishing abroad technical
assistance relating to Munitions list items and 3) classified and unclassified technologi-
cal data related to items on the Munitions list.
40. The State Department is required to obtain the concurrence of the Defense
Department and also coordinate its actions with the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.
41. Iceland is the exception.
42. See generally Note, COCOM: Limitation on the Effectiveness of Multilateral
Export Controls, WIs INT'L L. J. 100 (1983) (hereinafter Note, COCOM).
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countries considered unfriendly. 3 Through strict visa requirements, the
U.S. maintains control over the number of scholars who can visit the
U.S. to study or participate in important seminars and conventions.""
The recent trend in many U.S. schools of charging foreign students
higher educational fees than U.S. citizens, has discouraged foreigners
from coming to the U.S. for technical studies.
The implications of U.S. export control laws on the transfer of
technology cannot be ignored. It is true that a significant part of these
controls, for security reasons, are directed against communist nations
and relate to militarily sensitive technology which is not a priority area
for developing countries given their present interests in industrial and
agricultural technology. To this extent, much of COCOM's controls
and the EAA's control of commercial goods with military application
do not raise serious concerns in the developing world. Of far greater
significance to developing countries, however, are the controls on non-
military goods which may be imposed to meet the dictates of foreign
policy. The U.S. has not hesitated to apply such controls under a wide
variety of circumstances.4 The definition of foreign policy is particu-
larly troublesome to developing countries who are genuinely concerned
about the vagueness inherent in foreign policy."' Further, they fear that
minor differences of opinion will be labelled as contrary to U.S. foreign
policy and therefore attract export controls as a form of diplomatic
pressure. 7 Under the EAA, controls could be applied to technical data
relating to design and manufacturing knowledge48 which is desperately
43. Given that population movements between countries constitute such an impor-
tant method for the transfer of technology, to the extent that developed countries place
restrictions on travel to their countries, there will be a corresponding negative effect on
technology transfer. Oldham, Freeman & Sercovitch, supra note 11, at 8.
44. The United State's attempts at one time to deny visas to students and academ-
ics from countries such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, sus-
pected of illegally trying to obtain technical or military information, was criticized as
an intrusion into the policy of academic freedom. See, e.g., K. McDonald, U.S. to Re-
strict Visas for Visitors Likely to Obtain Data Illegally, 26 THE CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDUCATION No. 12 21 (1986).
45. See for example, its application following the seizure of U.S. hostages in Iran,
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland.
46. Thus, although the U.S. professes to restrict sales of critical technology to the
communist world, it nevertheless sells advanced computer technology to China. It also
sells the same technology to Pakistan but not India, although both countries can be
described as friendly to the U.S.
47. See H.E. Moyer & L.A. Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign
Policy: The History, Legal Issues and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 L. &
POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 1, 156-158 (1983).
48. See 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(a) (1987).
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needed by the developing world. Regulations directed against North
Korea, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Cuba and Iran show the reach of export
control laws over non-strategic goods in their application to some devel-
oping countries considered unfriendly to the U.S., a phenomenon which
clearly demonstrates the potential of export control as a severe restric-
tion on the transfer of technology.
III. TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTIONISM THROUGH RESTRICTIVE
BUSINESS PRACTICES
Aside from export controls by the governments in developed coun-
tries, some technology transfer arrangements by private foreign tech-
nology suppliers also limit the technology access by the developing
countries. The monopoly TNCs have over technology undoubtedly gives
them a superior edge in the negotiation process and they are able to
win generous concessions granting them almost complete control over
the technology receiving enterprise. Contractual limitations on technol-
ogy access generally relate to tied purchases of imports, restrictions on
exports, requirements of guarantees, restrictions on competition in the
domestic market, and control of industrial property rights.
Where contractual provisions require the developing country to
purchase intermediate products, capital equipment and spare parts
from the technology supplying countries ostensibly for technical reasons
or the purpose of guaranteeing the quality of the product, these provi-
sions have in fact worked as a convenient method for the withdrawal of
profits from developing countries. 9 Tied purchase clauses, by prevent-
ing developing countries from buying necessary inputs at a competitive
world market rate, force them to rely on a technology supplier who
thereby acquires monopoly control and may engage in various transfer
practices.50 Export restrictions which may take the form of global bans
on exports, export permission for specified countries only, export quo-
tas, or higher royalties for exported products, adversely impact on the
export potential of developing countries, and consequently limit the ad-
vantage that could otherwise be derived from the sales abroad of goods
49. J. BHAGWATI, THE TYING OF AID, PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, SECOND SESSION, U.N. Doc. TD/7/supp.
4, U.N. Sales No. E.68.1l.DI7 (1968).
50. Overpricing of inputs imported by foreign pharmaceutical companies in Co-
lumbia reportedly increased 155%, while it reached 500% and 300% in Chile and
Peru, respectively. See Major Issues Arising From the Transfer of Technology to De-
veloping Countries, 17 UNCTAD TD/B/AC.I1/10/Rev.2 (1975) (hereinafter
UNCTAD, Major Issues;) Transnational Corporations and International Trade: Se-
lected Issues, UNCTC at 13-14 (1985).
19891
310 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 13
produced with the imported technology.51 This is particularly disap-
pointing because many developing countries, as debtor nations, look to
their exports to generate much needed foreign exchange.52
In some cases, guarantees have been required from the technology
recipient regarding changes in profits and royalties, tax rates, tariffs
and the exchange rate.53 Fixed royalty payments, required regardless of
the level of operations, increase production costs and reduce the profit-
ability of the investment for the developing country. Onerous stabiliza-
tion clauses on rates of taxation, depreciation, allowances and tax hold-
ings, seriously limit the developmental potential of the technology
transfer process. Not surprisingly, several transfer arrangements have
in the past collapsed because of the unwillingness of developing coun-
tries to accede to the conditions presented by the developed countries.54
A large portion of the restrictive practices are found in the indus-
trial property area which includes patents, licensing, and trademarks.
The contracts typically impose an obligation on recipients to keep all
technical information confidential and not to transfer, assign or sub-
license the rights to anyone, an obligation which may continue even
after the expiration of the agreement. In some cases, the recipient is
even required to return all the technical information and stop using the
technology after expiration of the agreement.55 As a consequence of the
prohibition on transfer, technology is confined to the technology recipi-
ent, unavailable to other producers, who are then forced to make fresh
arrangements with the same technology supplier, giving rise to the
problem of repetitive import of technology.5"
In situations where imported technology could be used in several
51. S.J. Soltysinski, The Impact of New Transnational Technology Transfer Con-
trol Systems on the International Patent System: A European System, in CONTROL-
LING INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, ISSUES, PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY IM-
PLICATIONS 89, 98 (1981).
52. J.H. Barton, The Role of Private Enterprise in Technology Transfer, at 20,
USAID PDC-0-00-6033-00 (1986).
53. UNCTAD; Major Issues, supra note 51, at 21-24.
54. It is not uncommon for the technology supplier to insist on a provision requir-
ing the developing country's government to compensate him for any losses suffered as a
result of changes in the fiscal regime. See K.K. SUBRAHMANIAN IMPORT OF CAPITAL
AND TECHNOLOGY: A STUDY OF FOREIGN COLLABORATION IN INDIAN INDUSTRY
(1972).
55. Control of Restrictive Practices in the Transfer of Technology Transactions,
II UNCTAD TD/8/C.6/72 (1982) (hereinafter UNCTAD Control of Restrictive
Practices).
56. REPORT OF WORKING GROUP III: PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THIRD SESSION, annex. VI, 1.22 U.N.
No. E.73.II.04 (1973).
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areas, it is possible for the technology supplier to restrict the use of
technology to only one sector. Grant back provisions, often inserted in
agreements, oblige the technology recipient to inform the technology
supplier of any improvements made in the use of the transferred tech-
nology, but often do not impose any obligation to inform the recipients
of any improvements the suppliers may make themselves.5 This is
manifestly unfair as the recipient is thereby denied access to the fruits
of the licensor's research and development which, in most cases, he has
contributed to through royalty payments.
Other restrictions relate to limitations on changes to import design
which often require the recipient to manufacture the products adhering
strictly to the specifications of the technology suppliers, without the
right to make changes in the product or process designs. In some con-
tracts, the recipient is obliged to incorporate changes introduced in the
technology of the suppliers country regardless of their usefulness or
suitability in the developing country.68 The import of these restrictions
is to prevent the adaptation of imported technology to local conditions,
a step which is puzzling given that the imported technology is generally
made for the developed country, and there is often the need for some
modification when the technology reaches the developing country.8 9
Restrictive tendencies are also found in exclusive or representation
agreements which limit the freedom of the developing country enter-
prise to organize a distribution system independent of the technology
suppliers, and in price-fixing clauses which compel the recipient of
technology to sell his products at prices specified by the supplying par-
ties. To protect their interests, the technology suppliers insert non-com-
petition clauses to restrict the developing country from entering into
arrangements related to competing or other technologies not provided
by the technology supplier."' By tying the recipient to outdated technol-
ogy, the duration of an arrangement can limit the value of technol-
57. UNCTAD Control of Restrictive Practices, supra note 55, at 128.
58. SUBRAHMANIAN, supra note 54, at 149-152.
59. Technology sold by TNCs is that which is developed for use in the industrial-
ized countries. There is little incentive to direct their technology production to satisfy
developing country needs as these markets are often too small to guarantee sufficient
profits. Additionally, TNCs would much rather encourage the purchase of existing
technology than the creation of varieties of technology, in line with their established
goal of efficiency derived from standardization. See Transfer of Technology, Its Impli-
cations for Development and Environment, 35 UNCTAD TD/B/C.6/22 (1978) (here-
inafter UNCTAD Transfer of Technology).
60. Such clauses generally require the recipient to refrain from manufacturing or
selling competing products, acquiring competing technology and even terminating the
further use of technologies and products developed by the technology supplier himself.
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ogy.6 ' All of these restrictions in the technology transfer contracts are
commonly safeguarded by the use of no challenge clauses requiring the
technology recipient not to challenge the validity of rights granted
under the technology transfer arrangement.62
IV. DEVELOPING COUNTRY RESPONSE TO TECHNOLOGICAL
PROTECTIONISM
A. National Policies
The leading early attempt at regulation of technology transfer is
Decision 24 of the Cartagena Agreement63 ("The Decision") adopted
in 1970 which sets a common approach for the treatment of foreign
technology by the six Andean Group countries." The Decision recom-
mended the establishment by each member state, of a national agency
to supervise technology transfer contracts."5 In deciding whether to ap-
prove or deny a transaction, the national agency was to consider the
potential impact of the imported technology, and in particular the ex-
pected benefits and price. It was mandatory that every agreement de-
scribe its duration, the form of technology transfer and the value of
every aspect of transfer.66 Tie-in clauses, restrictions on volume of out-
put, restrictions on the use of competing technologies and price-fixing
arrangements were specifically barred from all technology transfer con-
tracts.67 To enable a better evaluation of the cost of technology, infor-
mation and control systems over the prices of imported intermediate
goods were required to be maintained in each country. A concerted
effort was made to weaken industrial property protection by prohibiting
among other things, grant back provisions and payments of royalties
for unused patents. Further, the grant of patent privileges could be de-
nied to particular products and processes.
61. A survey in India demonstrated that up until March, 1964, 51% of all con-
tracts in the pharmaceutical industry were for a duration of 10-15 years. RESTRICTIONS
ON EXPORTS IN FOREIGN COLLABORATION AGREEMENTS IN INDIA, U.N. Sales No.
E.72.II.07 (1972).
62. UNCTAD Control of Restrictive Practices, supra note 55, at 20.
63. Passed in 1971, the Decision provides regulations governing foreign capital
movement; trademarks; patents; licenses and royalties. See Compilation of Legal Ma-
terial Dealing with Transfer and Development of Technology, 227 UNCTAD (1982)
(hereinafter 1982 Compilation of Legal Material) for extracts of the Decision.
64. They are Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Columbia and Venezuela.
65. 1982 Compilation of Legal Material, supra note 63, at Art. 6.
66. As a rule, a contract had to specify among other things, the form of transfer,
the value of aspects of the technology and the duration of the contract. Id. at Art. 19.
67. Id. at Art. 20.
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The Decision recommended the adoption by member states of con-
tinuous and systematic identification of available technologies on the
world market to facilitate the selection of the most desirable technolo-
gies for the region.68 Governments were urged, in their purchases, to
grant preference to products incorporating subregional technology
while further taxes were to be levied on goods produced from imported
technology already publicly available or readily accessible.
Other developing countries, following the Andean Group lead,
have passed their own technology transfer legislation. Typically, the
laws create a national agency to screen technology transfer agreements
for restrictive business practices. As the following examples demon-
strate, some of the national laws have expanded on the list of prohib-
ited clauses and emphasized the development of local technology. For
example, under Colombian legislation, that country's Foreign Exchange
Office, in approving the registration of contracts requiring payments in
foreign currency, 69 not only examined the duration of patents applica-
ble and the effects of the proposed contract on the country's balance of
payments, but also the feasibility of manufacturing the same product
using available national technology."0
Brazilian regulations 71 limit the duration of contractual obligations
resulting from a license to the same period of validity accorded to in-
dustrial property rights72 and prohibit limits on the free use of techni-
cal data and the use of no-contest clauses. 73 There is also a limitation
of ten years on royalties paid on listed patents and trademarks. Follow-
ing the initial ten year period the licensee could use the patent or trade-
mark without further obligation to the licensor. Brazil's National Insti-
tute of Industrial Property (INIP), the agency charged with
administering patent and trademark systems and regulating technology
transfer agreements7' may condition the approval of foreign contracts
on the implementation of a program of investment in the technological
68. Id. at Art. 22.
69. Decree No. 444 on International Exchange Regulations Relating to the Ap-
proval and Registration of Contracts for the Transfer of Technology, March, 1967,
reprinted in 1982 Compilation of Legal Material, supra note 63, at 53 (hereinafter
Decree No. 444).
70. Id. at Art. 102.
71. Normative Act. No. 015 Establishing Basic Principles and Norms for the Re-
gistration of Contracts Involving the Transfer of Technology and Related Agreements,
September, 1975. See also 1982 Compilation of Legal Material, supra note 63, at 25.
72. Decree No. 444, supra note 69, at Art. 3.4.
73. Id. at Art. 2.5.2.
74. Law No. 5,648 Establishing the National Institute of Industrial Property, De-
cember, 1970, reprinted in 1982 Compilation of Legal Material, supra note 63, at 21.
19891
314 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 13
infrastructure of the recipient company and research and development
in the same enterprise or through a research institute. Brazilian law
also obligates firms acquiring technology abroad to justify their need
for import and selection of the foreign supplier by providing the INIP
with comparative data for similar technology on file with its Patent
Bank."
To meet its goal of expanding the use of technological information
contained in patents, the Brazilian government has established a pro-
gram for the automatic provision of technological information known as
PROFINT.71 In furtherance of this objective, appropriate arrange-
ments have been made with some government agencies" to facilitate
access to patent information by small firms. There is even an obligation
to consult the Patent Bank prior to the acquisition of foreign technol-
ogy although small firms and other firms participating in the
PROFINT program are exempt.s
Mexican technology transfer laws 79 with few exceptions, 80 man-
date registration of agreements relating to trademark licenses, patent
assignments, technical assistance, and computer programs.8" Restrictive
75. Normative Act No. 65/83. See Periodic Report on Policies, Laws and Regu-
lations Conducive to Development, Transfer and Acquisition of Technology,
UNCTAD TD/B/C.6/111 Corr. 1 and Corr. 2 at 7 (1984) (hereinafter 1984 Periodic
Report).
76. Participants must first register with the INIP, after which they are granted
automatic access to information contained in patents.
77. See for example the National Confederation of Industry and National Council
of Science and Technology.
78. Normative Ace No. 074/85 August 29, 1985. See Periodic Report 1986: Poli-
cies, Laws and Regulations on Transfer, Application and Development of Technology,
15 UNCTAD TD/B/C.6/133 (1986) (hereinafter 1986 Periodic Report).
79. The present law is the Law on the Control and Registration of the Transfer of
Technology and the Use and Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks, supplemented by
the Regulations of the Law on the Control and Registration of the Transfer of Tech-
nology and the Use and Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks. See 1982 Compila-
tion of Legal Material, supra note 63, at 96.
80. Those agreements exempted from registration include agreements of interna-
tional technical cooperation executed between Governments; the industrial exploitation
of copyrights pertaining to the publishing, motion picture, recording, radio and televi-
sion fields, emergency assistance or repairs and the bringing into Mexico of foreign
technicians to install factories or machinery or make repairs. Law on the Control and
Regulation of the Transfer of Technology and the Use and Exploitation of Patents and
Trademarks, Art. 3. See also 1984 Periodic Report, Supra note 75 at 96.
81. They include licenses on patents of invention or of improvements and on cer-
tificates of invention; licenses on industrial models or drawings; trademark assignments
and tradename licenses; transfer of know-how; technical assistance; supply of basic or
detail engineering; company operation or administration services; advisory, consulting
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practices prohibited in contracts include exclusive sales agreements,
clauses which allow the supplier to intervene in the management of the
technology recipient and impose limitations on the recipient's techno-
logical research and development, as well as those under which the sup-
plier does not warrant the quality and results of the contracted technol-
ogy.82 The law prohibits the registration of agreements for technology
that is already available or of agreements made at prices considered to
constitute an excessive burden on the national economy or acquiring
company.8 3
The maximum term allowed for any contract is ten years and all
agreements are to be governed by the laws of Mexico, or the applicable
international agreements to which Mexico is a party.84 The Ministry of
Technology in the national interest, could waive any of the prohibitions
against, or conditions for, the registration of any agreement.85 To pro-
mote research, development and the marketing of national technology,
incentives in the form of aid facilities and tax credits are provided," to
companies which register with the Registry of Scientific and Techno-
logical Institutions, and the Registry of Technological Enterprises.8"
One of the conditions the Ghana Investments Centre may impose
in approving the establishment of an enterprise involving the technol-
ogy transfer is the training of Ghanaians in technical and managerial
skills related to the operations of the enterprise concerned. To en-
courage domestic technological development, Ghana approved enter-
prises which sponsor scientific research that mirrors the Mexican prac-
tice since it provides some tax incentives like capital expenditure
deductions.88 The Ghanaian law does not deal with restrictive practices,
but provision has been made for the future adoption of regulations on
the subject.8 9
and supervisory services and copyright licenses that imply industrial exploitation. Id. at
Art. 2.
82. Id. at Art. 15.
83. Id. at Art. 16.
84. Id.
85. Id. at Art. 17.
86. See Decree Establishing Fiscal Incentives to Promote Research, Development
and the Marketing of National Technology, November, 1980, reprinted in 1982 Com-
pilation of Legal Material, supra note 63, at 106 (hereinafter Decree of 1980).
87. Registration entitles the applicant to a Certificate of Fiscal Promotion, valid
for five years.
88. Investment Code 1985, Provisional National Defense Council Law 116, at §
12(2).
89. Id. at § 30.
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Like its Mexican counterpart, the Nigerian law on technology9" is
broad in scope.9 Among restrictive practices forbidden are clauses that
provide for the submission to foreign jurisdiction for interpretation or
enforcement of a technology agreement." The Nigerian attitude re-
garding restrictive conditions appears to be flexible, for the Governing
Council, in exercise of its discretionary powers, may overlook a restric-
tive practice where it is in the national interest to do so."
The policy of the Indian Government has always been "to welcome
foreign private investment on a selective basis in fields in which such
investment would be of advantage to the Indian economy.'"" As a re-
sult, foreign participation has been prohibited in some areas, in others
foreign collaboration is required in the form of licensing agreements,
while in yet other areas, no collaboration is necessary. Where foreign
investment is permitted, the foreign equity participation is limited to
40%"' and some limitations are placed on the fees and royalties that
may be paid.9 To ensure approval of their agreements, the Govern-
ment urges technology suppliers to adhere to guidelines which require
among other things, the consideration of alternative sources of technol-
ogy and an explanation for choosing a particular technology, and per-
mit sub-licensing of technology to another Indian party. The Indian
laws prohibit guaranteed royalty payments regardless of the quantum
and value of a product, the use of foreign brand names for internal
sales and the extension of collaboration agreements. 97
The guidelines also encourage the training of Indians in fields of
production and management, the strengthening of Research and Devel-
opment efforts and require that consultancy services for the project be
obtained from Indian firms.98 In 1984, in a bid to promote the com-
puter industry, the Indian government revised the application of its
90. National Office of Industrial Property Decree No. 70 (1979).
91. Under § 40(d) of the National Office of Industrial Property Decree No. 70,
the following arrangements must be registered: a) the use of trademarks; b) the right
to use patented inventions; c) the supply of technical expertise; d) the supply of basic or
detailed engineering; e) the supply of machinery and plant; and I) the provision of
operating staff or managerial assistance and the training of personnel.
92. 1982 Compilation of Legal Material, supra note 63, at Decision Art. 6(2).
93. Id. at Art. 6(3).
94. Government of India: Guide to Investing and Licensing in India (1978).
95. Government of India: Guidelines for Industries, Part 1, Policy and Procedures
§ 3(a) (1982) (hereinafter Indian Guidelines for Industries).
96. Ordinarily, royalties do not exceed 5% of the value of the annual output and
are taxed at a 40% rate, while lump sum fees attract a 20% rate.
97. Indian Guidelines for Industries, supra note 95, at § 4.
98. Id.
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guidelines in so far as they applied to the computer industry. Computer
programs are now protected by copyright,99 and procedures for the
manufacture, import and export of computers have been revised to en-
courage the indigenous manufacture of computers. 100 The revisions led
to the abolition of an upper limit on manufacturing capacity, facilitated
faster processing of applications, and permitted a more liberal import
of computer technology. The importation of small computers' 1° has
been banned but large computers may be imported after approval by
the Department of Electronics.
Since the late 1970s, Korea has maintained a liberalized policy
regarding the entry requirements for foreign investment and technology
transfer. To improve existing law, a negative list system was estab-
lished which opens all sectors of the Korean industry to foreign invest-
ment unless prohibited by a presidential decree or by the Ministry of
Finance. 102 Where a contract is not on the negative list and satisfies
some minimum requirements, automatic approval is given by the Min-
istry of Finance.10 3 In other cases, the approval is subject to referral to
the relevant ministries and review by the Foreign Project Review Com-
mittee. The new law currently only requires the registration of agree-
ments although power has been reserved to the government to review
contracts ex post facto.0 " Imports of sophisticated technology are auto-
matically approved twenty days after reporting.
B. International Efforts
The most significant effort to regulate technology transfers at the
99. The Copyright (Amendment) Act of 1984, Act. No. XIX defines literary
property to include computer programs.
100. 1984 Periodic Report, supra note 75, at 8.
101. Defined to include computers that cost less than Rs. 10 million (US $8,000).
102. See The Foreign Capital Inducement Act of 1983. See also 1986 Periodic
Report, supra note 78, at 11. The old law contained a positive list system which per-
mitted investment only in specified sectors.
103. Automatic approval is available in all fields where the contract is for less
than 10 years and where the royalty rate is 10% or less.
104. Although the competent minister can review an agreement with regard to the
contents of technology, the method of transfer, and the royalty and conformity with
national legislation, he is only empowered to request a modification of the agreement if
the technology inducement is accompanied by the use of a foreign trademark. In this
context Korean regulations limit the use of a foreign trademark on consumer goods for
domestic sale and prohibit extensions of the term of an agreement, the sole purpose of
which is to continue the use of the trademark. The Minister also has broad power to
prohibit an agreement to protect a domestic industry for a specified period of time. See
1986 Periodic Report, supra note 78, at 12.
1989]
318 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 13
international level' 0 5 is by the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD). Initiatives on a code for technology
transfer date as far back as 1961 with attempts to modify the interna-
tional law on patents in favor of developing countries."" In 1970, the
UNCTAD Secretariat was instrumental in the conduct of surveys
which focused on the problems of the existing world technology market
and the costs of technology transfer.0 7 Conclusions of these surveys
made a clear case for multilateral action to assist the market process, a
move which was facilitated by events in Latin America where govern-
ments had begun to argue for greater national regulation of technology
transfers.
Negotiations for a code of conduct on technology transfer have
been conducted by the Group of 77, which represents developing coun-
tries, and Group B, which represents developed countries. From the
perspective of developing countries, the objective of the Code is to pro-
tect technology recipients, promote an equitable and relatively stable
technology market, legitimatize and harmonize national methods for
the regulation of international transfer contracts, and assist in data col-
lection and the enforcement of technology contracts. 0 8 Developed
countries, on the other hand, view the Code as a means of establishing
procedures for the adjudication of technology transfers and other forms
of investment and establishing standards for the treatment of TNCs. 1°9
The United Nations Conference on an International Code on
Transfer of Technology ("the Conference") which has been meeting
since 1978 to narrow these fundamental difference,"0 failed at its sixth
105. See MANSER & WEBLEY, supra note 10, at 42-48 for a useful chronology of
United Nations discussions on technology transfer.
106. The early efforts led to a United Nations Conference on the Application of
Science and Technology for the Benefit of Less Developed Areas on February 8, 1963,
and the founding of a technology advisory committee. See W. Fikentscher, 11 Draft
International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology (1980).
107. Citations to the early works on technology transfer can be found in
UNCTAD Guidelines, supra note 1.
108. A.A. Fatouros, International Controls of Technology Transfer, in CONTROL-
LING INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, ISSUES, PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY IM-
PLICATIONS 478, 494 (1981).
109. Id. at 495.
110. These contrasting views have come to be reflected in an ongoing debate about
the legal nature of the code, i.e. whether it should be adopted in a binding form such as
a convention or a less binding form such as a recommendation. Developing countries
apparently prefer a very detailed code, applicable to all technology transfer contracts,
while Group B countries prefer a code establishing non-binding guidelines and applica-
ble to just a small number of contracts. See H.V. PERLMUTTER & T. SAGAFI-NEJAD,
INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 42 (1981) for a comparison of these views.
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session held May 13 to June 5, 1985, to reach a final agreement on a
code. The major stumbling block was the lack of consensus on the defi-
nition of restrictive practices as it applies to intra-enterprise transac-
tions. " ' Some minor disagreement arose in the discussions of issues re-
lating to unpackaging, confidentiality and the national regulation of
transfer of technology enterprises. The Conference did agree in princi-
ple to condemn as impermissible a number of items similar to those
already prohibited under national laws." 2 In 1985 and again in 1986,
the United Nations General Assembly invited the Secretary General of
UNCTAD 11 to consult with regional groups and relevant governments
on issues unresolved in the code. In his report, the Secretary General
has indicated that the matter of restrictive business continues to be a
devisive issue, although flexibility from some governments has been evi-
denced which makes a compromise solution to those issues likely.'
Therefore, one of his recommendations call for the convening of a sev-
enth negotiating session.
In addition to its efforts to produce a technology transfer code, the
UNCTAD Secretariat has prepared a set of multilaterally approved
equitable principles and rules for the control of restrictive business
practices," 5 which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in
111. See THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON AN IN-
TERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNCTAD TD/
CODE/TOT/49 (1985); P. Roffe, UNCTAD: Code of Conduct on Transfer of Tech-
nology, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 669 (1985).
112. The practices so far agreed upon include restrictions after expiration of ar-
rangement; payments after expiration of right; exclusive grant-back provisions; chal-
lenges to validity and sales or representation agreements relating to competing technol-
ogies or products. Others relate to restrictions on research; use of personnel; price-
fixing; restrictions on adaptations; tying arrangements and export agreements. The rest
are cartel, patent-pool or cross-licensing agreements; limitations on volume; use of
quality controls; obligations to use trademarks; requirements to provide equity; unlim-
ited or unduly long duration or arrangement and limitations on the use of technology
already imported. See M. Ariga, Restrictive Business Practices and International Con-
trols on Transfer of Technology, in CONTROLLING INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER, ISSUES, PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 177, 188 (1981).
113. See International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, G.A.
Res. 40/184, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (1985); International Code of Conduct on the
Transfer of Technology, G.A. Res. 41/184, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (1986).
114. Negotiations on a Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of
Technology, 8 UNCTAD TD/CODE/TOT/51 (1987).
115. See Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the
Control of Restrictive Business Practices, UNCTAD TD/RBP/CONF/10 (1980). See
also C.R. Greenhill, UNCTAD, Control of Restrictive Business Practices, 12 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 67 (1978); M.R. Joelson, The Proposed International Code of Con-
duct as Related to Restrictive Business Practices, 8 L & POLICY INT'L Bus. 837
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1980.116 The practices condemned include price-fixing agreements, col-
lusive tendering, market or customer allocation arrangements,11 and
predatory behavior towards competitors." 8 Though the principles focus
primarily on international anti-trust, they still bear some relevance to
technology transfer contracts. Nations have been urged to control the
identified negative business practices by the adoption of appropriate
legislation which are reviewed periodically by the United Nations Con-
ference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Eq-
uitable Principles and Rules for the Conference of Restrictive Business
Practices." 9
The Intergovernmental Commission on Transnational Corpora-
tions (ICTC) and the UN Center of Transnational Corporations
(CTC) have undertaken a substantial of the work on the international
regulation of the activities of TNCs. The CTC is presently working on
a code of conduct to reduce some of the negative activities of TNCs
and encourage them to make more positive contributions to Third
World.120 A final TNC code has not been adopted since some impor-
tant issues such as the treatment of TNCs are not yet resolved. 2'
Various international projects have also been commissioned in the
area of industrial technology whose results impact on the transfer of
technology to developing countries. The definition of patents in the
Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883122
has been amended to make it more conducive to developing coun-
tries. 23 The objective is to provide greater local control over technolog-
(1976).
116. Restrictive Business Practices, G.A. Res. 35/63, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. No.
40-48 at 123 (1980).
117. Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control
of Restrictive Business Practices, supra note 115, at § D3.
118. Id. at § D4.
119. See Review of All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, UNCTAD
TD/RBP/CONF/2/3 Adds. 1,2,3,4 and TD/RBP/CONF/2/4 (1985).
120. Fikentscher, supra note 106.
121. See S.K.B. Asante, The Code: The January, 1986 Reconvened Special Ses-
sion, 21 CTC REPORTER 14-19 (Spr. 1986).
122. The Convention has gone through a number of administrative and substan-
tive revisions, most recently in 1967.
123. The major issues tackled in the revision include the principles of national
treatment and independence of patents for the same invention granted in different
countries. Working requirements, grace periods and licenses of right are also consid-
ered. Additional issues include grants of preferential treatment to developing countries
without reciprocity, technical assistance, types of protection other than patents and
trademarks. The remaining issues involve reservations, colonial clauses, scope of protec-
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ical development through such measures as compulsory licensing to
force the working of patents, the grant of less than national treatment
to certain patentees/licensors, and extended priority filing dates, for
citizens of developing countries.'" Two international conventions, the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic works of
1896,125 and the Universal Copyright Convention 12 6 now provide for
preferential treatment of developing countries. The United Nations In-
dustrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and World Industrial
Property Organization (WIPO) have been able to provide guidelines
which are helpful in the acquisition of foreign technology by developing
countries, particularly regarding technology license agreements and the
negotiation of technology transfer agreements in general. 2 7 Within
WIPO, a legal technical program has been set up to aid developing
countries with licensing, patent documentation, and model clauses for
national property laws. 12 8
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, although traditionally
more concerned with economic matters, play a significant role in the
transfer of technology. Major reforms are continually urged in GATT
and IMF to make them more responsive to the needs of developing
countries for better terms in trade and the transfer of technology. 2 9 It
tion of process patents, right of priority and unanimity. See H.P. Kunz-Hallstein, The
Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology to the Less Developed Countries, Re-
port by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. E/3861/Rev.1
(1964); Kunz-Hallstein, Patent Protection, Transfer of Technology to Developing
Countries - A Survey of the Present Situation, 6 INT'L REV. COPYRIGHT & INDUS-
TRIAL PROPERTY L. 427-28 (1975); N. Mangalo, Patent Protection and Technology
Transfers, 9 INT'L REV. COPYRIGHT & INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY L. 100 (1978); S.
Timberg, The Role of The International Patent System in the International Transfer
and Control of Technology, in CONTROLLING INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANS-
FERS, ISSUES, PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 64 (1981); The International
Patent System; The Revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, UNCTAD TD/B/C.6/AC.3/2 (1977).
124. License Agreements in Developing Countries, 5 UNCTC ST/CTC/78
(1987) (hereinafter License Agreements).
125. The Convention was first completed in Paris on May 4, 1896 but has since
been revised several times, most recently on July 24, 1971.- The current law can be
found in Diplomatic Conference for Revision of the Berne Convention 135 (1971).
126. The present revision of the Convention can be found in 25 UST at 1341
(1974).
127. See UNITED NATIONS, GUIDELINES FOR THE ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN
TECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TECHNOL-
OGY LICENSE AGREEMENTS (1973).
128. License Agreements, supra note 124, at 5.
129. Fikentscher, supra note 106, at 21.
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is significant that the Brandt commission, 3 0 created by the IMF and
the World Bank, in its 1980 report, recommended the large scale trans-
fer of resources to developing countries as well as reforms in the inter-
national economic system.'
Measures have also been undertaken by various regional groupings
with the goal of improving the transfer of technology among the partic-
ipating countries. For example, the conventions that created the Afri-
can Carribean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), have emphasized the need for technological
cooperation in various fields, and have contained commitments from
the EEC to assist developing countries in their efforts to consolidate
indigenous technology and to acquire appropriate technology. 32 This
pledge has been followed by the establishment of suitable administra-
tive agencies, one of which, the Centre for Industrial Development, is
responsible for the development and acquisition of technology in devel-
oping countries.' 3 Countries participating in the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA)3 have agreed to cooperate in new
technology areas related to computerization of national economies,
automation, nuclear power and biotechnology. 35 Where necessary, it is
envisaged that the CMEA countries would integrate their research and
development production and establish international and engineering
technology centers for the development and production of new
technologies. 36
130. Its official name is the Independent Commission for International Problems
of Development. It was created to seek ways of improving the trade and monetary
aspects of transactions involving developing countries.
131. North-South, A Program of Survival, Independent Commission on Interna-
tional Development Issues (1980). For a critical appraisal of the report, see S. Lall,
Brandt on Transnational Corporation Investment and the Sharing of Technology, in
THIRD WORLD STRATEGY: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COHESION IN THE SOUTH 149
(1983).
132. See Lome I Convention of February 28, 1975; Lome II Convention of Octo-
ber 31, 1979; Lome III Convention of December 8, 1984.
133. In performing these functions, the Centre is expected to identify, collect,
evaluate and supply information and advice on the acquisition, adaptation and develop-
ment of appropriate industrial technology relating to specific projects. See 1986 Peri-
odic Report, supra note 78, at 26-27.
134. CMEA countries include the socialist nations of Eastern Europe, Cuba,
Mongolia and Vietnam.
135. These principles contained in the Comprehensive Programme for Scientific
and Technological Progress of the Member Countries of the CMEA up to the year
2000, were agreed upon at a meeting of the CMEA held in Moscow on December 18,
1985.
136. 1986 Periodic Report, supra note 78, at 27-28.
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Similarly, the Latin American Council has adopted a strategy for
Latin America and the Carribean to strengthen the region's scientific
and technological capacity. Methods utilized include intra-regional co-
operation in the transfer of technology and the creation of a regional
forum to analyze and generate information.137
Reports and recommendations of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) evidence its efforts to control
restrictive practices. 38 In April 1985, its Council of Ministersadopted
the Declaration on Transborder flows which affirmed the desire of
OECD countries to promote access to data, information and related
services, and to avoid the creation of unjustified barriers to the interna-
tional exchange of data and information. 139
V. EVALUATION
Governments of developing countries have reacted to perceived
limitations in the technology transfer process by modifying general
trade laws to give existing regulatory agencies more control over tech-
nology transfer, and by creating new agencies directly responsible for
the technology transfer process. 40 The adverse impact export controls
have on technology transfer has been noted, but since developing coun-
tries typically wield no influence in the formulation of developed coun-
try trade policies, they have been unable to respond to the controls at a
policy level. Consequently, critics of export controls on technology re-
side in developed countries themselves, and many of them argue that
export controls are not only ineffective," 1 but in the long run harm the
developed country economies.4 '
The scope of the new laws is quite comprehensive and often clearly
outlined as in the Nigerian and Mexican examples. Only necessary
technology is to be imported, and for this reason there is a restriction
137. See Decision No. 229, adopted April 19, 1986.
138. See, e.g., Recommendation Concerning Cooperation Between Member Coun-
tries and Restrictive Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C(67) at 53
(1967).
139. See 1986 Periodic Report, supra note 78, at 32.
140. Specific technology transfer laws have been passed in Mexico, Argentina,
Honduras, India, Iraq, Tanzania, Nigeria, Brazil, Zambia, Venezuela, Columbia, Ne-
pal, Peru, Thailand and the Philippines. General laws on trade and investment, which
have some significant bearing on technology transfers have been passed in the Domini-
can Republic, Ghana, Pakistan and Korea.
141. For example, when the United States government refused to grant Arco a
license to build a $353 million electric steel mill in the Soviet Union, a French firm
took over the contract. See HELLER, supra note 2, at 106.
142. See, e.g., Note, COCOM, supra note 42, at 106.
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on imports of technology that is readily available in the country. India
in particular, has a highly selective approach to investment,143 permit-
ting foreign collaboration in limited areas and insisting on large domes-
tic participation through its equity participation requirement. In sharp
contrast, the Korean regulation has a liberalized approach and opens
all sectors to foreign investment unless specifically prohibited.
As discussed above, the technology legislation of a developing
country 'prohibits restrictive practices from any technology transfer
agreement for which approval is sought from the competent national
authority. Progress has been made in the attempt to modify the law on
industrial property in favor of developing countries by the general pro-
hibition of grant back provisions. It frees the technology recipient from
any obligation to assign to the supplier any improvements he may have
made to the technology. Technology-receiving countries no longer bind
themselves to keep technical information secret after the expiration of
the contract, and they require that the technology supplier expressly
assume liability for the infringement of industrial property rights by
third parties. Other efforts have concentrated on eliminating controls
that the supplier would seek to place on the receiving industry concern-
ing management, volume of production, prices of goods, and exports
sales agreements. The duration of contracts has been shortened consid-
erably and it is now provided that questions of interpretation or en-
forcement of the contract are to be governed by national law.
The main objective of governments in passing these laws has been
to promote the transfer of appropriate technology for industrial devel-
opment by increasing the bargaining position of national firms vis a vis
foreign technology suppliers. The elimination of restrictive practices is
sought to reduce any long term technological dependence of developing
countries on foreign suppliers. Typically, the regulations aim to
strengthen the recipient country's technological capacities and improve
its bargaining position vis a vis the supplier. For example, licensing
controls would prohibit certain types of technology in order to allow the
growth of the domestic sectors in that industry.""' The specialized
agencies have a role to play in this as some of them have been assigned
responsibility for organizing research and development activities and
promoting the growth of local technology. The specialized agencies also
guide local importers to select on the best terms, the best type of tech-
nology available for adaption to local needs. Through their licensing
143. J. Baranson & R. Roark, Trends in North-South Transfer of High Technol-
ogy, in INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 24, 31 (1985).
144. F. Sagasti, Science and Technology for Development, Main Comparative
Report of the Science and Technology Policy Instruments Project 67 (1978).
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efforts, adequate information is gathered to aid the governments in the
development of coherent national policies on technology. Policies
adopted have favored the unpackaging or unbundling of technology, a
move believed to strengthen the bargaining power of the purchaser, in-
crease the learning effects of the technology transfer and reduce the
loss of control by the recipient. Attempts at the international level to
formulate codes of conduct for technology transfer and TNCs are
aimed at further strengthening the regulatory and negotiating capacity
of developing countries.
Predictably, these efforts by developing countries to enhance their
access to technology have met with some resistance from the developed
world. 4 5 The United States, in particular, views these developments as
unacceptable incursions on the principle of freedom of contracts that
underlies its free market system. Under such a system, the parties to a
contract are generally presumed to be of equal bargaining strength ca-
pable of reaching a binding agreement in their mutual interests.' 46 A
mandatory code of conduct for TNCs and the various national technol-
ogy transfer laws by prohibiting standard contract terms typically in-
serted by TNCs for their protection, impinge on the freedom of the
TNCs to acquire the best terms for themselves. The U.S. has countered
the efforts of developing countries to eliminate typical fiscal guarantees
and control prices in technology transfer arrangements by reiterating
its strong support for the profit motive of TNCs, which it is argued,
leads to a healthier economy. 7 Appropriate technology should not be
provided in developing countries as a charity at the expense of the
TNCs. The U.S. contends that placing price controls on technology
transfer will not only decrease the supply of that technology but will
lead to long-run distortions. 8 The reduction in industrial property pro-
tection, which is sought by the developing countries, has also been
strenuously opposed. As required under its law,' 49 the U.S. guarantees
145. See, e.g., Statement by the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Before the
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the
House Judiciary Committee, on July 23, 1987, in 87 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLE-
TIN 2127 at 27 (1987).
146. See generally S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (3rd
ed. 1967).
147. F.F. Farabow & J.M. Bagarazzi, Development at the United Nations Con-
ference on Science and Technology, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 134, 136 (1980).
148. Barton, supra note 52, at p.v. See also L. Hoffmann, The Transfer of Tech-
nology to Developing Countries: Analytical Concepts and Economic Policy Aspects,
INTERECONOMICS 73, 80 (March/Apr. 1985).
149. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 enables Congress to "promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
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patent protection as a way of encouraging further research and does
not agree with the view that patent protection ought to be modified, or
worse, that technological information be made freely available. 150 The
U.S. has continually insisted that developing countries adopt the tradi-
tional property system in the hope that it would not only encourage a
greater investment by developed country firms in the developing coun-
tries, but also halt the spread of counterfeit goods which adversely af-
fect the market for the goods in question.16 1
The freedom of contract arguments have done little to dissuade
the governments of developing countries which continue to see the as-
sertion of equal bargaining power by parties to a contract as a myth.
TNCs typically possess far superior knowledge about the technology
they transfer.1 52 Also, in the monopolistic market of technology suppli-
ers, developing countries do not have an opportunity to discriminate
among sellers to obtain the best terms and are forced to rely on one
seller who exacts the highest prices. Anti-monopoly legislations of de-
veloped countries have, by and large, been unhelpful in checking these
abuses.1 53 Developing countries are not unaware of the profit motive of
TNCs'54 as the U.S. position tends to assume; they only discourage
contracts where, by relevant standards of the industry, the profits are
considered excessive. Developing countries continue to be baffled by
U.S. opposition to their control of restrictive trade practices when the
U.S. Justice Department prohibits many of the same practices from
patent licenses. 55
It is yet too early to draw conclusions on the success of efforts of
the various developing countries at regulation, since most of the laws
have only recently been implemented. A few studies prepared so far in
right to their respective writings and discoveries."
150. Note, The United States and North-South Technology Transfer: Some
Practical and Legal Obstacles, Wis. INT'L L. J. 205, 221-223 (1983).
151. Barton, supra note 52, at 15.
152. Fatouros, supra note 108, at 483.
153. United States antitrust laws, though mainly concerned with monopolies
within U.S. territory, will also reach contracts made outside the United States, where
those contracts produce illegal effects within the U.S. The monopolies complained of by
developing countries often fail to meet this criteria and hence go unregulated under
United States law.
154. G.K. Helleiner, International Technology Issues: Southern Needs and
Northern Responses, in MOBILIZING TECHNOLOGY FOR WORLD DEVELOPMENT 84, 87
(1979).
155. The prohibited clauses include compulsory grant-backs of new inventions,
mandatory package licensing and requirements that the licensee adhere to the mini-
mum price. P. MARCUS, ANTI-TRUST LAW AND PRACTICE 436 (1980).
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the area indicate that some appreciable benefits have indeed been de-
rived from regulation, although some problems have been found. In the
Nigerian case, the NOIP, although established in 1979, did not begin
evaluating agreements until 1983. To date its major activities have
been monitoring payments and restrictive clauses and little is known
about its other important function of selecting industrial technologies.
With respect to payments, a report released in 1985 indicated that the
NOIP's intervention in 62 registered agreements resulted in a total sav-
ings of N33,041.654.156 Its attempts to control restrictive clauses have
been equally impressive. The office has worked hard to eliminate the
numerous restrictive clauses it found during its examination of agree-
ments, but given the economic and technological importance of some
projects it has found it necessary to adopt a flexible policy of eliminat-
ing only the least acceptable restrictions.
Problems encountered in the implementation of the Nigerian law
include inadequate information furnished by applicants, reception from
the Nigerian public 157 and a reluctance on the part of the foreign tech-
nology suppliers to revise existing contracts to conform to the require-
ments of the decree. 158 Solutions are evolving gradually with the availa-
bility of detailed questionnaires for use by applicants, the enhancement
of the image of NOIP through effective publicity campaigns by the
office, and by general acceptance in the world community of technology
transfer regulations.
Appraisals of the Andean Pact have also been positive. Initially,
however, there were many problems since the pact met with great resis-
tance from TNCs in the region. Statistical tests showed a significant
initial decline in the growth rate of foreign investment in the region,
the obstacles to investment cited include the rules on ownership and
profit remittances. 159 Nevertheless, the Code is to be credited for secur-
ing an increase in the proportion of local ownership of foreign affiliates,
reducing profit remittance to almost twenty percent of registered capi-
tal in any year, and generally disallowing payment for technology
transfers from parent firms. Not surprisingly, the verdict on the An-
dean Pact is that it has "altered permanently [company behavior] in
156. The Implementation of Laws and Regulations on Transfer of Technology:
The Experience of Nigeria, 14 UNCTAD UNCTAD/TT/74 (1985) (hereinafter The
Experience of Nigeria).
157. This was because few in the business community went to the Office for ad-
vice on proposed agreements.
158. The Experience of Nigeria, supra note 156, at 18-19.
159. R. GROSSE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT CODES AND LOCATION OF DIRECT INVEST-
MENT (1980).
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the region, in directions desired by host governments."' 160
Substantial foreign exchange savings have been reported in Mex-
ico as a result of its technology transfer law. Up until 1976, some $250
million had been saved, a figure which matches the figure from a year's
import of technology. 6' Between 1973-1978 the Mexican Registry ex-
amined 4,600 contracts and rejected thirty-five percent as containing
restrictive clauses, while between 1967-71, the Comite de Regalias
evaluated 395 contracts, modified 3,334 and rejected 61. 11 It managed
to reduce royalties by forty percent, tie-in clauses by ninety percent,
minimum royalty payments by ninety percent and was able to elimi-
nate restrictions on exports. Similar successes at reductions in technol-
ogy payments have been reported in Brazil. 6 '
Some commentators have questioned the effectiveness of these
controls, arguing that although the restrictions might have disappeared
from contractual language, foreign technology suppliers are still able to
manipulate policy makers in developing countries, in effect mitigating
the impact of the regulations." Further, they are able to replace de
jure restrictions by de facto controls, for as suggested, "a potential li-
censee who needs technology is in fact at the mercy of the licensor who
has the technology. No amount of government intervention can restrict
the pressures imposed by a licensor and most licensees submit volunta-
rily to the demands, although the formal contract may not reflect any
controls."' 6 This was the case in Brazil when the INPI encountered
some difficulties in controlling technology transfer agreements because
of the existence of informal agreements quite separate from the formal
contract, between the national supplier of technology and his foreign
supplier.' 66
To be realistic, however, it does not appear feasible at the moment
160. R. Grosse, Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 16 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 414, 429 (1982). But see S. Bitar, La inversion estadounidense, en 98 EL
GROUPO ANDINO INTEGRACION LATINOAMERICA 42, cited in Barton, supra note 52, at
21.
161. H.A. Janiszewski, Technology-Importing National Perspectives in CON-
TROLLING INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, ISSUES, PERSPECTIVE AND POL-
ICY IMPLICATIONS 306, 312 (1981).
162. Recent Developments in the Regulation of Foreign Technology to Develop-
ing Countries, UNIDO TD/B/AC.I 1/19 Rev.1. (1974).
163. L.P.R. CAMPOS, REGULATING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: BRAZILIAN AND
MEXICAN EXPERIENCE 53 (1984).
164. F. Stewart, Technology Transfer in North-South Relations: Some Current
Issues, in TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 203, 211 (1981).
165. Id.
166. CAMPOS, supra note 163, at 53.
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to eliminate all restrictions given the contractual obligations of technol-
ogy suppliers in earlier contracts, the importance of some technologies
to the developing countries, the monopolistic nature of some of the sup-
pliers and the types of patents they control. But the data indicates a
general positive trend for technology transfer regulation with the elimi-
nation of most restrictive trade practices.1 17 Additionally, there is the
gradual acceptance of the new controls by technology suppliers. This
change in attitude has resulted in large part because of the flexible
nature of some of the controls as indicated in the Nigerian and Mexi-
can examples. National legislation, contrary to the initial fears, has not
resulted in the provision of inferior technologies, rather, it has en-
couraged competition among technology suppliers, much to the advan-
tage of developing countries. Although the policy of controlling tech-
nology transfer is costly for the developing countries - there are the
usual regulatory costs and delays, as well as problems of corruption -
168 policy makers feel that such costs are heavily outweighed by the
benefits, and as developing country expertise and administrative capaci-
ties improve, the efforts to screen technology imports will undoubtedly
continue." 9
The continuing progress in the formulation of a code of conduct is
very encouraging. A great deal of compromise is necessary to make the
code universal, flexible, and adaptable to the technology transfer ar-
rangements of the various political groups in the world. Opposition to
the code has traditionally been centered on the ground that it would
reduce the volume or increase the cost of technology transfers. 70 With
the positive results reported from the short experience of national regu-
latory laws on technology, such fears about the code can now be laid to
rest. When adopted, the code will constitute a broad framework for
promoting technology transfers between nations and provide adequate
procedures for enforcing technology transfer contracts. Developments
taking place at the regional level show a tendency toward collaboration
to present a unified effort in the search for suitable technology for de-
velopment. Such a coordinated effort will be necessary to supplement
the individual national efforts to fight the restrictive practices of TNCs,
a problem which is not to be taken lightly given the sheer sophistication
of the TNCs.
167. Janiszewski, supra note 161, at 3-14.
168. Barton, supra note 52, at 19.
169. Helleiner, supra note 154, at 87.
170. Id. at 90.
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